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 Do Correlated Exposures Influence Intermediary Decision-making? 
Evidence from Trading Behavior of Equity Dealers 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether dealers’ trading and pricing decisions are governed by their 
equivalent inventories (based on total returns as in Ho and Stoll, 1983 or on unhedgeable 
returns as in Froot and Stein, 1998) or by their ordinary inventories, as would be the case in a 
decentralized market-making organisational structure. It finds that ordinary inventories, and 
not equivalent inventories best explain dealers’ quote placement strategy, which dealer 
executes trades and the quality of execution offered to the trades. This finding is consistent 
with decentralized market making where, due to information sharing difficulties or the nature 
of compensation contracts, individual dealers care only about risk of stocks managed by them, 
and not the positions of other dealers within the firm.  
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Do Correlated Exposures Influence Intermediary Decision-Making? 
Evidence from Trading Behavior of Equity Dealers 
1. Introduction 
 If I am long one million dollars in General Motors, and I am short one million dollars 
in Ford, am I still long one million dollars in General Motors?  
Dealers in competitive dealership markets take on inventory risk of the securities in 
which they make a market. There is an extensive literature that shows us that dealers actively 
manage this risk by controlling individual asset inventories2. However, typically, dealers 
make a market not just in one security, but in a large number of securities. For example, each 
of the ‘wholesalers’ on the NASDAQ, and about three-fourths of the dealers on the LSE make 
a market in over hundred stocks3. Hence, dealers’ management of inventory risk, and their 
trading behavior, should arguably be based not on inventories at the individual security level 
but on overall inventories aggregated across their total portfolio of securities. In this paper we 
examine if this is indeed the case. 
The importance of correlated exposures in the context of market-making was first 
emphasized by Ho and Stoll (1983) (hereafter H&S). They show that the dealer’s trading 
behavior in a given stock should be guided (not by her ordinary inventory holdings in that 
stock but) by her equivalent inventory in that stock. This equivalent inventory is simply the 
dealer's ordinary inventory in that stock corrected for any reinforcing or offsetting effects 
arising from inventory positions in all other stocks with correlated returns.  
                                                 
2Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Madhavan, and Smidt (1993) and Madhavan, and Sofianos (1998) analyse 
specialists’ inventories on the NYSE; Lyons (1995) studies the inventory of one FX dealer; Mann, and Manaster 
(1996) examine behavior of scalpers in the Chicago futures market; Neuberger (1992), and Snell, and Tonks 
(1998) study the aggregate inventory of all London equity dealers while Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998) 
and Reiss and Werner (1998) examine individual dealer inventories. Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) 
document evidence consistent with active inventory control. 
3 See Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (1999) and Naik and Yadav (1999).  
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More recently, Froot and Stein (1998) (hereafter F&S) examine the decision-making 
problem of financial intermediaries when some but not all risks can be hedged. They show 
that the attitude of an intermediary towards an additional unit of risk in a stock depends on its 
unhedgeable component and the amount of correlated unhedgeable risk she carries in her 
portfolio. Hence, dealer decision-making in the F&S framework depends on ordinary 
inventory (a significant proportion of the risk of which is unhedgeable or stock-specific) and 
on an unhedgeable equivalent inventory measure based (not on correlation in total returns, as 
in H&S, but) on correlation in unhedgeable returns. This measure is relevant for an equity  
dealer who hedges completely the market risk of her portfolio with futures contracts such as 
S&P 500 futures in the US or FTSE100 futures in London. 
Clearly, from a theoretical perspective, equivalent inventories (total or unhedgeable), 
rather than individual inventories, should govern dealers’ trading behavior. However in 
practice, other factors also play an important role, factors not specifically incorporated in 
these theoretical models. For example, each market-making firm consists of a large number of 
individual dealers to whom trade related decision-making in different stocks is delegated. This 
decentralized structure provides incentives for the individual dealers (who take the actual 
trading and risk management decisions) to be concerned only about the ordinary inventory 
risk of the individual stocks managed by them, rather than the overall position of the dealer 
firm as a whole that also includes positions in correlated stocks of other individual dealers 
within the firm.  
There are potentially two effects of the decentralized nature of market-making. First, 
there are difficulties in effectively sharing information in real time across the large number of 
dealers making a market in different but correlated stocks. And second, the performance of 
these individual dealers is evaluated, and their compensation is determined according to the 
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trading profits they generate in stocks assigned to them. Imposing constraints on the position 
of an individual dealer in a particular stock based on the inventory of another dealer in a 
correlated stock contaminates the clean performance evaluation measure and hence increases 
the firm’s agency costs. As a result, with decentralized market-making, the influence of 
correlated risk exposures predicted by theoretical models is unlikely to get fully reflected in 
the trading behavior of the firm. Thus, the net influence of correlated exposures on dealers’ 
trading behavior can be determined only through empirical analyses.  
In this paper, we use transactions audit-trail data from the London Stock Exchange 
(hereafter LSE) to investigate whether the trading behavior of dealers is governed by their 
total equivalent inventories as in the Ho and Stoll (1983) model, or by their unhedgeable 
equivalent inventories as in the Froot and Stein (1998) model, or by their ordinary inventories 
as in a decentralized market-making organizational framework (hereafter the decentralized 
market-making model). We examine four aspects of dealers’ trading behavior: intensity of 
mean reversion in inventories, quote placement strategy, which dealer executes public and 
inter-dealer trades, and the quality of execution she offers to the trades.  
We find that dealers’ ordinary inventories exhibit stronger mean reversion than either 
of their equivalent inventories, that their quote changes are significantly related to changes in 
their ordinary inventories and not to either of their equivalent inventories, that dealers with 
divergent ordinary, rather than equivalent, inventories execute public trades and engage in 
inter-dealer trades, and dealers with divergent ordinary, rather than equivalent, inventories 
offer significantly better quality of execution4. These findings confirm that ordinary 
                                                 
4 During our sample period, the LSE (like NASDAQ) is a competing dealer market in which dealers’ bid and ask 
quotes are displayed on a screen. However, public trades are typically executed through bilateral negotiations 
over the telephone and may receive price improvement. The dependence of terms of trade offered on size and 
type of trader has been investigated in the literature (Reiss and Werner, 1994). This paper provides the first 
empirical evidence on the relation between inventories and quality of execution.  
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inventories govern dealer decision-making, and hence that the trading behavior of dealers is 
best explained by the decentralized market-making model.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the testable 
implications of Ho and Stoll (1983), Froot and Stein (1998) and the decentralized market-
making models. Section 3 describes the data and explains how ordinary and equivalent 
inventories are constructed. Section 4 describes the methodology used in investigating the 
issues and documents the empirical results. Section 5 describes the findings from numerous 
robustness checks. Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Key implications of theoretical models 
 
In this section, we describe the key testable implications of Ho and Stoll (1983), Froot 
and Stein (1998) and the decentralized market-making model. 
2.1.  Key implications of Ho and Stoll’s (1983) model 
In H&S model, the reservation fee of a dealer for buying or selling a fixed quantity of 
a given stock depends on the variance of the stock return, the risk aversion of the dealer and 
the 'equivalent' inventory level of the dealer in that stock, where the equivalent inventory is 
the dealer’s ordinary inventory of the stock corrected for any reinforcing or offsetting effects 
from her inventory positions in other correlated stocks. In their model, a dealer with the 
longest (shortest) equivalent inventory executes a buy (sell) trade, where the ‘equivalent’ 
inventory ji, tEI  of dealer i in stock j at time t is given by  
, , , ,
j j j
i t i t j k i t
k j
EI OI OIβ
≠
= +∑   (1) 
where jm, tOI  is the ordinary inventory of dealer i in stock j at time t; j, kβ  is the regression 
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coefficient capturing the dependence of the return of stock k on that of stock 
j, j k
j
COV(  , )R R
VAR( )R
 
 
 
, and the summation extends over all other stocks k j≠ .  
 The H&S model implies that the trading behavior of dealers in a stock will be 
governed by equivalent inventories rather than ordinary inventories of that stock. The 
emphasis is on two aspects: first, on the correlated risks arising from inventory positions in all 
other securities at a firm-wide level; and second, on total risk rather than the unhedgeable risk 
emphasised by F&S discussed below. 
2.1. Key implications of Froot and Stein’s (1998) model 
F&S argue that a financial intermediary cannot efficiently hedge all risks in capital 
markets, and show (see their Proposition 2, pp 64) that a financial intermediary will always 
wish to hedge fully its exposure to any tradeable risk. Their model implies that a dealer’s 
attitude towards bidding for and pricing a block of shares will depend only on her attitude to 
the unhedgeable component of the risk. Hence, a dealer’s trading behavior in a stock will 
depend on her inventory of that stock and the extent of correlated unhedgeable risk arising 
from her inventories in other stocks. That is, it would depend on an equivalent inventory 
defined on the basis of correlations in unhedgeable returns rather than correlations in total 
returns (as in H&S).  
2.3. Key implications of the decentralized market-making model  
As mentioned in the introduction, typically, market maker firms make a market not 
just in one security but in a large number of securities. These market-making firms delegate 
the task of posting quotes and negotiating trades in different securities to individual dealers. A 
large market maker firm may have dozens of such individuals. These individual dealers 
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decide at a micro-level what quotes to post, whether to execute a particular trade, and if so, 
what price to charge for that trade. 
 With decentralized market-making, there exist two reasons why dealers may be more 
concerned with individual asset inventories rather than the (total or unhedgeable) equivalent 
inventories. First, as a practical matter, there exist difficulties in sharing relevant information 
across a large number of dealers who work for the same firm but make a market in different 
stocks. This is especially true when a large number of individual dealers are negotiating and 
executing trades across a large number of securities almost on a continuous basis. There could 
arguably be some information sharing at the trading desk level, but it is likely to be very weak 
at the firm-wide level. 
 Second, the performance of these individual dealers is evaluated, and their 
compensation is determined according to the trading profits they generate in the stocks 
assigned to them. Giving the freedom to an individual dealer to manage the inventory of her 
stocks gives a clean measure of her contribution to the profitability of the business.  It also 
helps efficiently specify the individual dealer’s compensation package. Imposing restrictions 
on the position an individual dealer can take in a given stock, based on the inventories of 
other dealers in correlated stocks, contaminates the performance evaluation measure and 
hence increases agency costs5.  
Thus in a decentralized market-making structure, due to information sharing costs or 
incentive contracts, an individual dealer cares only about the risk of the stocks managed by 
her. Hence, the dealer’s trading behavior in a stock depends on her ordinary inventory of that 
stock.  
                                                 
5 Essentially, the market making firm faces a trade off in which the benefits of cost reduction through offsetting 
of correlated exposures at individual stock level have to be weighed against the increase in overall agency costs 
due to the contamination of performance evaluation measure involved. 
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3. Data and construction of ‘ordinary’ and ‘equivalent’ inventory series 
 
Our data spans the three months (65 trading days) from August 1, 1994 to October 31, 
1994. Over the calendar year 1994, the average daily turnover of UK and Irish equities was 
£2.4 billion, the average number of transactions was 37,000 and the average trade size was 
£64,000 (Source: Quality of Markets Quarterly, Winter 1994). Trading in the large stocks 
(which are part of the FTSE-100 index) and in the medium stocks (which are part of the 
FTSE-250 index) accounts for over 85 percent of the turnover in U.K. and Irish equities on 
the LSE. Hence, we focus on market-making in the large and medium stocks. For 
computational tractability and for ease of presentation, we randomly select a total of twenty 
stocks: ten FTSE-100 stocks and ten FTSE-250 stocks.  
Our data set provides time-stamped details of all quotes and all transactions for all 
stocks traded on the LSE. It identifies the dealer participating in each transaction, whether the 
dealer bought or sold, and their dealing capacity in the transaction, i.e. whether they acted as 
agent representing an order from the public, or as principal trading on their own account. 
Transactions data on the LSE has been used by several other researchers to explore interesting 
but different issues6. Most of these studies (eg Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan, 1998; Reiss 
and Werner, 1998) use data sets in which the codes of different dealers and brokers change 
                                                 
6 For example, Reiss and Werner (1994) study transaction costs; Snell and Tonks (1995) analyse components of 
the bid-ask spread; Gemmill (1996), and Board and Sutcliffe (1995) examine the impact of different 
transparency rules on trading costs; Hansch and Neuberger (1996) explore trading strategies of market makers; 
Board, Vila, and Sutcliffe (1996) examine the commitment of different market makers as providers of liquidity 
and contributors to price discovery; Reiss and Werner (1998) investigate inter dealer trading on the LSE; 
Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1999) examine the effect of preferencing, internalization and best execution on 
trading costs; Naik and Yadav (1999) analyse the differences in the quality of execution offered by different 
dealers and different brokers; Naik and Yadav (2000) study changes in trading costs of public investors after the 
market reforms, and Hillier, Naik, and Yadav (1999a) and Hillier, Naik, and Yadav (1999b) examine dealers' 
inventory control around anticipated and unanticipated information events (earnings announcements and 
directors’ trades) respectively. 
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from security to security, thus making it impossible to generate portfolio related inferences 
that require aggregation across stocks. Importantly from the perspective of this paper, our data 
set assigns the same code to a dealer across different stocks. This enables the construction of 
inventory positions of individual dealers over time in individual stocks as well as cross-
sectionally aggregated positions across all stocks.  
3.1. Construction of ‘ordinary’ and ‘equivalent’ inventory series 
As dealers differ in terms of capitalization and/or risk aversion, their inventories 
cannot be directly compared with each other. Therefore, we follow Hansch et. al.’s (1998) 
procedure (described in the Appendix) and construct the standardized ordinary inventory (OI) 
series, for each stock and for each dealer separately. Similarly, using information on the 
identity of each dealer across different stocks, we construct H&S’s ‘equivalent’ inventory 
series defined in eq. (1) for each dealer for each of our twenty sample stocks. Towards that 
end, we collect, from the London Share Price Database, monthly stock returns of each of the 
1854 stocks in our data set over the five year period prior to the start of our sample period. 
We use these sixty monthly returns series to calculate j, kβ  - the slope of the regression line 
capturing the dependence of the return of stock k on the return of stock j, for all relevant pairs 
of stocks (j, k). In our case, j varies from one to twenty – the twenty sample stocks, and k 
varies from one to remaining 1853 stocks. Using these j, kβ , we calculate the pound sterling 
value of equivalent inventories for each dealer in our 20 sample stocks. Finally, to make the 
equivalent inventories comparable across dealers, we standardize them by subtracting the 
sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. 
We compute our equivalent inventory measures in four different ways. These 
measures differ from each other in the way j, kβ  is computed (i.e., using total returns as in 
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H&S and using unhedgeable returns as in F&S) and in the number of stocks over which the 
second term in eq. (1) is summed. First, we construct the Total Firm-wide Equivalent 
Inventory (TEI_FW) based on correlations in total returns and aggregating positions across 
1854 stocks. Second, in the context of the decentralised market-making, we consider one 
common form of organisation in which the market-making function is organised, i.e. by 
trading desks based on industry sectors. In such a case, the relevant correlated exposures will 
be at the industry-desk level. We capture this by calculating TEI_ID, the Total Industry-desk 
Equivalent Inventory, by summing the second term in eq. (1) only over the stocks belonging 
to the same industry group. 
Analogous to the two measures of equivalent inventory above, we also construct two 
measures of equivalent inventory in the spirit of F&S by assuming that dealers hedge away all 
market-risk at each point in time. We call these measures Unhedgeable Firm-wide Equivalent 
Inventory (UEI_FW) and Unhedgeable Industry-desk Equivalent Inventory (UEI_ID) 
respectively. To incorporate hedging of market-risk, we modify the calculation of regression 
coefficients in eq. (1). Instead of regressing total returns of stock k on total return of stock j, 
we now regress the “abnormal” or market-filtered returns (using the market model) earned by 
stock k on those earned by stock j during the five-year period to the start of our sample period.  
As before, for UEI_FW, we sum the second term in eq. (1) over all stocks k, where k varies 
from one to 1853. For UEI_ID, we sum the second term in eq. (1) only over the stocks 
belonging to the same industry group.  
3.2. Sample statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics relating to the twenty sample stocks listed in 
decreasing order of their turnover.  The average daily total turnover of our sample stocks 
varies from £30.1 million in NatWest Bank to £0.4 million in WPP Group, the sample 
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average being about £6 million. A significant proportion of the total turnover is due to public 
trading. The average daily public turnover varies from £16.3 million in NatWest Bank to £0.3 
million in WPP Group, the sample average being £3.7 million. The average daily number of 
public trades of our sample stocks varies from 172 in NatWest Bank to 4 in First Leisure 
Corporation, the sample average being 42. The sample average size of public and inter-dealer 
trades (not reported) is respectively £112,000 and £210,000. Within our sample of twenty 
stocks, an average of about ten dealers deal in each stock. Four stocks have fourteen dealers 
or more while twelve stocks have ten dealers or fewer.  
For firm-wide equivalent inventories based on correlations in total returns as in H&S 
(TEI_FW), the average j, kβ  across the twenty sample stocks equals 0.37, varying from a 
minimum of 0.15 to a maximum of 0.86. For firm-wide equivalent inventories based on 
unhedgeable returns as in F&S (UEI_FW), the average j, kβ  equals 0.41, varying from 0.14 to 
0.89. These firm-wide j, kβ are based on summing the second term in eq. (1) over 1854 stocks. 
When we consider market-making organised around industry desks, the number of stocks 
included in the equivalent inventory construction varies from a minimum of 6 to a maximum 
of 39, average being 14. The average j, kβ  equals 0.21 (0.16) for total (unhedgeable) industry-
desk based equivalent inventory, varying from about 0.05 to 0.44 for the total risk measure 
and from 0.03  to 0.43  for the unhedgeable risk measure.  
Table 1 also reports the R2 of the regression from the market model, as reported by the 
June 1994 issue of the London Business School Risk Measurement Service.  This R2 averages 
37%, varying from a maximum of 63% to a minimum of 4%. 16 out of the 20 sample stocks 
have an R2 greater than 30%. This R2 captures only the dependence on market returns, and not 
the additional systematic dependence that exists with respect to industry and other risk factors 
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such as size and book-to-market. Clearly, for the vast majority of our sample stocks, the level 
of dependence on systematic factors that generate correlations between stock returns is large 
in magnitude, and would ordinarily be expected to influence dealers’ trading behavior, unless 
dealers care only about positions in the stocks they trade, either because they do not know the 
positions of other dealers or because of the nature of their performance evaluation measure. 
Having described the salient features of the data, we now proceed with our empirical 
investigation. 
 
4. Empirical investigation  
 
In this section, we examine which measure of inventory (total equivalent, unhedgeable 
equivalent and ordinary) explains best four different aspects of dealers’ trading behavior. 
First, we analyze the mean reversion in dealers’ inventories and examine which inventory 
measure tends to revert to the mean most rapidly. Second, we analyze dealers’ quote 
placement behavior and investigate which inventory measure is most associated with it. Third, 
we examine the extent to which a dealer’s buy and sell trades are related to the divergence of 
her different inventory measures. Finally, we investigate the extent to which the quality of 
execution offered to trades by a dealer is related to the divergence of the different measures of 
her inventories.  
4.1. Mean reversion in inventory 
 If dealers are risk averse or face inventory carrying costs, their inventories would 
display mean reversion.  If the inventory of a dealer goes above (below) her target inventory 
level, she will potentially change her quotes and/or, during negotiation, offer better prices to 
attract order flow in a direction that brings her inventory towards the target.  In a competitive 
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dealership market, when a dealer has an extreme inventory position she can post competitive 
quotes on one side and has a better chance of executing order flow in that direction, resulting 
in relatively rapid reduction in the inventory imbalance.  However, when a dealer's inventory 
is close to the median inventory, at that time she cannot post competitive quotes and therefore 
has a poor chance of executing the public order flow, resulting in a relatively slow reduction 
in the inventory imbalance.  This argument implies mean reversion in relative inventories, i.e., 
relative to the inventory of the median dealer. 
 In competitive dealership markets, the strength of mean reversion should increase with 
the magnitude of the inventory level. Up to a certain level of deviation of inventory from the 
target level, dealers may not worry too much.  But once the deviation reaches a threshold 
level, dealers may actively start managing their inventory risk exposure. This suggests that 
instead of a linear model, it may be more appropriate to use a threshold autoregressive 
piecewise linear model in inventory levels. Therefore, following Hansch et. al. (1998), we 
estimate a piecewise linear model for mean reversion in inventories with the thresholds pre-
specified as corresponding to a distance of one standard deviation and two standard deviations 
from the mean on either side. 
 We examine which of the inventory measures tends to revert to the mean most rapidly 
by estimating the following regression7 
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1t t t t t t tI D I D I D I D I D Iα φ φ φ φ φ ψ− − − − −∆ = + + + + + +  (2) 
 where: lD  (l= 1, 2, …, 5) are dummy variables that take a value of one depending on the 
distance of the inventory in multiples of standard deviations (σ ), 1D = 1 if 1 2tI σ− ≥ , 
otherwise zero; 2D = 1 if 12 tIσ σ−> ≥ , otherwise zero; 
3D = 1 if 1tIσ σ−> > − , otherwise 
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zero; 4D = 1 if 1 2tIσ σ−− ≥ > − , otherwise zero, and 
5D = 1 if 12 tIσ −− > , otherwise zero. lφ , 
l = 1, 2, …, 5  represents the intensity of mean reversion which depends on the relative 
inventory level, and tψ  is a white noise error term.  
 Table 2 summarizes our findings. Consistent with the nature of trading in 
competitive dealership markets, we find strong non-linearities in the intensities of mean 
reversions. When inventories diverge a great deal, the intensity of mean reversion is much 
greater (about three times that when inventories are around their mean). For ordinary 
inventory the intensity of mean reversion lφ  varies from -0.561 when inventory is more 
than two standard deviations away from the mean to -0.151 when inventory within one 
standard deviation from the mean8. The mean reversion coefficients for each of the four 
measures of equivalent inventories show a similar pattern. The average lφ  across the four 
equivalent inventory measures for all stocks varies from -0.365 in regime one to -0.124 in 
regime three.  
 Irrespective of the applicability of the different competing models of dealer behavior, 
if individual inventories are stationary, equivalent inventories should be stationary as well 
since equivalent inventories are linear combinations of ordinary inventories. Hence, in 
general, equivalent inventories will also display mean reversion if ordinary inventories are 
mean reverting. For the purpose of our investigation, the question that is important is the 
following: which of the three inventory measures reverts to the mean most rapidly. Is it total 
equivalent as predicted by Ho and Stoll (1983) or is it unhedgeable equivalent as argued by 
Froot and Stein (1998) or is it ordinary inventory as predicted by decentralized market-
                                                                                                                                                        
7 To compare and contrast our findings with those of Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998), we use a 
specification similar to theirs. Unlike us, their data does not allow construction of equivalent inventories. 
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making model?  
 In the context of the above, the difference in the mean reversion of ordinary and 
equivalent inventories is reported in the last four columns of Table 2.We find that across all 
stocks the intensity of mean reversion in ordinary inventory is greater than that in equivalent 
inventories in all 20 (four inventory measures times five regimes) cases, and this difference 
is statistically significant in 18 out of these 20 cases. The results for high liquidity (FTSE-
100) stocks separately and medium liquidity (FTSE-250) stocks separately are qualitatively 
similar as well. We also test the apparent dominance of ordinary inventories using an 
alternative approach. We compute, for each dealer i  dealing in stock j, the pairwise 
difference ,j i j, ieo l l- )(  φ φ , where ,j ilφ , l = 1, 2, …, 5 represent the mean reversion estimates 
for the five regimes in eq. (2); and the pre-scripts ‘o’ and ‘e’ represent ordinary and equivalent 
(either total or unhedgeable, firm-wide or industry-desk based) inventories respectively.  We 
then conduct a cross-sectional t-test to determine whether the average of these differences is 
significantly different from zero. Once again, we find that mean reversion in ordinary 
inventories is significantly greater than that in equivalent inventories (not reported). 
 The strong results above indicate that dealers care most about their ordinary 
inventory rather than either measure of their equivalent inventories, a finding that supports 
the implications of the decentralized market-making model relative to either the Ho and 
Stoll (1983) model or the Froot and Stein (1998) model. 
4.2. Quote changes and inventory changes 
 In the inventory models of dealership markets, like Ho and Stoll (1983) and Biais 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Our results with ordinary inventories are similar to those of Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998) who 
conduct similar regression during 91-92 period.  
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(1993), a dealer’s quote position is a monotone function of her inventory position. This 
implies that the changes in a dealer’s quote position over time must be a function of the 
changes in her inventory position over time. In this sub-section, we measure the change in a 
dealer’s ordinary and equivalent inventories corresponding to a change in her quote 
position.  
 In theoretical models, the dealer with longest (shortest) inventory position posts 
lowest ask (highest bid) price. The testable empirical implications have to be formulated in 
the context of the institutional practice of dealers on the LSE. We know from Hansch et. al. 
(1998) that LSE dealers follow the practice of having a constant quoted bid-ask spread in a 
stock, and this quoted bid-ask spread is identical for all dealers, and wider than the market 
spread, i.e. the difference between the best bid and best ask prices. As a result, at any point in 
time, a dealer’s quote position is such that either her bid quote equals the best bid, or her ask 
quote equals the best ask, or both her quotes straddle the market spread.  Moreover, starting 
from any one of these three positions, when a dealer decides to change the relative position of 
her quotes, she faces the choice of moving to either of the other two positions.  This implies a 
total of six possible quote position changes that could be observed in the data.  We summarize 
these six quote position changes in Table 3.   
 The inventory changes associated with quote position changes should arguably be as 
follows. First consider a dealer who starts by being at the best bid or the best ask. When the 
dealer moves her quotes from posting the highest bid quote to posting the lowest ask quote, it 
represents a change from being an aggressive buyer to being an aggressive seller. This is 
consistent with the notion that during the time the dealer was posting the highest bid quote, 
she was able to buy a large quantity of stock, resulting in a significant increase in her 
inventory, which she is trying to reduce by posting the lowest ask quote. Therefore, the 
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change in inventory of a dealer moving from posting the highest bid quote to posting the 
lowest ask quote must be positive and significant. By the same argument, the change in 
inventory of a dealer moving from posting the lowest ask quote to posting the highest bid 
quote must be negative and significant. Similarly, when a dealer moves her quotes from the 
highest bid (lowest ask) to straddling the market spread, the change in her inventory must be 
positive (negative) but not as large in magnitude when she moves her quotes to the opposite 
side of the market spread.  
 Next consider a dealer who starts from straddling the market spread but at some later 
point in time either posts the lowest ask quote or the highest bid quote. A move from 
straddling the market spread to posting the lowest ask quote suggests a keenness to sell and 
therefore implies a positive change in dealer’s inventory. Similarly, a move from straddling 
the market spread to posting the highest bid suggests a keenness to buy and therefore implies 
a negative change in inventory. As before, the magnitude of the change in inventory when the 
dealer moves from straddling the market spread to either side of the market spread will be 
smaller than when she moves her quotes from one side of the market spread to the other side. 
To test these implications of inventory models, we compute the change in a dealer’s 
ordinary and equivalent inventories, whenever her quote position relative to the market spread 
undergoes a change (i.e., either when she gets on to the market spread or when she gets off the 
market spread).  We average these changes across all dealers and across all stocks. Table 4 
summarizes our findings. For notational convenience, in Table 4 we use the term ‘Bid to Ask’ 
to denote the quote transition scenario in which a dealer’s quotes are at the bid side of the 
market spread at the start and then change to being at the ask side of the market spread.  The 
terms Bid to Straddle, Ask to Bid, Ask to Straddle, Straddle to Bid and Straddle to Ask 
indicate corresponding quote transition scenarios. 
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 We find that dealers’ quote changes are strongly related to the changes in their 
ordinary inventory.  The mean change in a dealer’s ordinary inventory from Bid to Ask (Ask 
to Bid) equals 0.138 (-0.129) standard deviations; the same mean change from Bid to Straddle 
(Ask to Straddle) equals 0.067 (-0.058) standard deviations – both changes being significant. 
These changes are in the direction predicted by the inventory models. It is important to note 
that the mean change in inventory when the quotes are moved from Bid to Ask (Ask to Bid) is 
larger in magnitude compared to when the quotes are moved from Bid to Straddle (Ask to 
Straddle). This magnitude difference is also consistent with inventory models that predict a 
monotone relation between quote positions and inventories. Finally, the mean change in a 
dealer’s ordinary inventory from Straddle to Bid and from Straddle to Ask respectively equals 
0.027 and -0.018. These mean changes are also consistent with inventory models.  
 In contrast, we do not observe any consistent and significant relation between changes 
in dealers’ quotes and the changes in either measure of their equivalent inventories (see Table 
4 columns three to seven). In fact, none of the quote changes are distinguishable from zero 
suggesting an absence of any relation between quote changes and either measure of equivalent 
inventory changes. The disaggregated results for high liquidity stocks and medium liquidity 
stocks separately (not reported) are also qualitatively very similar: there is a strong relation 
between quote changes and ordinary inventory changes but not equivalent inventory changes. 
These findings indicate that dealers care most about their ordinary inventories and position 
their quotes in a way that reduce the imbalance in their ordinary inventory, rather than total or 
unhedgeable equivalent inventory. This result is against the predictions of Ho and Stoll (1983) 
and Froot and Stein (1998) models, but is consistent with the trading behavior of dealers 
predicted by the decentralized market-making model. 
  
 
 18 
 
4.3. Inventories, public order flow execution, and inter-dealer trading 
 In theoretical models of competitive dealership markets, dealers with divergent 
inventories execute buy and sell orders. In this sub-section, we examine the level of ordinary 
and equivalent inventories of dealers executing public and inter-dealer trades to understand 
whether dealers with divergent ordinary inventories or dealers with divergent equivalent 
inventories execute public trades and engage in inter-dealer trades9. Since inventory effects 
are likely to be more pronounced for large-size trades as compared to medium-size or small-
size trades, we conduct our analysis separately for different trade-size (small, medium and 
large) categories. As average trade size differs considerably across stocks (see Table 1), we 
define small, medium and large trade-size in multiples of the NMS or the normal market size 
of that stock (defined at 2.5% of the average daily trading volume over the previous year). 
Consistent with prior research conducted with LSE data, we define trades less than or equal to 
one NMS to be ‘small’, trades greater than one NMS but less than three NMS to be ‘medium’, 
and trades greater than or equal to three NMS to be ‘large’10.  
 We examine whether dealers with the most divergent ordinary or equivalent inventory 
levels execute public orders and engage in inter-dealer trades. In particular, we measure the 
difference between the (ordinary or equivalent) inventory jIτ of the dealer executing the trade 
τ in stock j and the median jIτ , at the time of the trade, of the inventory across all dealers 
making a market in that stock.  If (ordinary or equivalent) inventories were relevant for the 
                                                 
9 In inventory models of dealership markets like Ho and Stoll (1983), inter-dealer trading occurs when dealers 
choose the certainty of inter-dealer trading in preference to the uncertain probability of a public trade arrival. 
Recent models like Lyons (1996) and Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanthan (1999) also have similar implications 
except that, in these models, dealers trade with each other also for informational reasons. 
10 The NMS for each stock is defined by the Exchange, and the dealers are required to post quotes with a quote-
depth of one NMS. Three times NMS is an important cutoff from regulation and post-trade disclosure on the 
LSE (see Gemmill (1996)).  
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decision making of dealers, the average difference across all trades will not be zero.  Our test 
metric, duly signed to enable aggregation of buy and sell trades, is the distance difference 
jDDτ defined in eq. (3) below. The average of 
jDDτ should be significantly positive if 
inventories are related to order flow execution. 
( )
( )
j j j
j j j
DD I I for a dealer sell trade
DD I I for a dealer buy trade
τ τ τ
τ τ τ
= −
= − −
                            (3) 
               
 Table 5 reports, for public trades and inter-dealer trades separately, the average of the 
distance difference jDDτ  for ordinary inventory and for various measures of equivalent 
inventory. Since relative importance of inventory effects may be a function of liquidity of the 
stocks, we report our findings separately for high-liquidity (FTSE-100) stocks and medium-
liquidity (FTSE-250) stocks. The parentheses contain t-statistics for hypotheses that these 
average inventory distance differences equal zero. 
 We find that the ordinary inventory distance differences explain extremely well which 
dealer executes large-size trades. In particular, across all stocks (see Table 5 top panel) the 
ordinary inventory of the dealer executing the trade is 0.61 standard deviations (or 0.61σ ) 
away from the median, and this is highly significant statistically (t-statistic of 12.32). The 
distance is somewhat larger for high liquidity stocks as compared to medium liquidity stocks 
(0.74σ  as opposed to 0.56σ ), however the difference is not statistically significant. The 
results with inter-dealer trades are similar. Dealers with ordinary inventories that deviate from 
the median by about 0.42σ  trade with each other and this is highly significant statistically (t-
statistic 7.79). For high liquidity stocks the distance equals 0.39σ  while for medium liquidity 
stocks it equals 0.45σ . The results for medium-size trades are also qualitatively similar to 
those for large-size trades with the magnitude of the inventory distance being somewhat 
smaller, 0.24σ  for public trades (t-statistic of 14.03) and 0.37σ  for inter-dealer trades (t-
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statistic of 15.59). These findings indicate that dealers with divergent ordinary inventory 
execute large and medium public trades and inter-dealer trades. 
 The results for small inter-dealer trades are also qualitatively similar, dealers with 
ordinary inventories that deviate from the median by about 0.23σ  trade with each other (t-
statistic 22.92). The average ordinary inventory distance of the dealer executing small public 
trades is considerably smaller compared to that for small inter-dealer trades (0.03σ  vis-à-vis 
0.23σ ), yet it also continues to be positive and statistically significant. The average distance 
difference for small trades is small in magnitude potentially because dealers have to often 
execute retail public trades irrespective of the level of their inventory due to the institutional 
practice of order flow preferencing and for the sake of maintaining customer relationships. 
Many market-makers are linked with specific retail service providers and brokers, and (for 
trades up to one NMS in size) are obliged to execute the trades sent by them at the best system 
prices, irrespective of their own quotes and their inventories underlying these quotes. These 
obligations and practices do not extend to inter-dealer trades. Even though the magnitude of 
average ordinary inventory distance is small for small public trades, the findings for small-
size trades are consistent with the findings with medium and large trades, and indicate very 
strongly that dealers with divergent ordinary inventory execute public trades and engage in 
inter-dealer trades. 
 In sharp contrast to the results for ordinary inventory, the average of the inventory 
distances are not significantly greater than zero at the five percent level either for public 
trades or for inter-dealer trades using either the total or unhedgeable, firm-wide or industry-
desk based equivalent inventory measures. Similarly, the results are not significantly different 
from zero either for high liquidity stocks or for medium liquidity stocks and for large, 
medium and small trades.  Occasionally, the distance difference turns out to be statistically 
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significant at the ten percent level but it is of a sign opposite to that predicted by theoretical 
models.  These results suggest the absence of any relationship between trade execution and 
either measure of the dealer’s equivalent inventory.   
 Overall, the findings in Table 5 provide clear evidence that public trades and inter-
dealer trades, irrespective of the size of the trade and the liquidity of the stocks, are executed 
by dealers with divergent ordinary inventories, and not by dealers with divergent total or 
unhedgeable, firm-wide or industry-desk based equivalent inventories. These findings 
strongly reject the predictions of Ho and Stoll (1983) and Froot and Stein (1998) models, but 
are consistent with the predictions of the decentralized market-making model where what 
dealers care most about is the ordinary inventory of the individual stock. 
4.4. Inventories and quality of execution 
 In inventory models of dealership market like Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and 
Stoll (1983), and Biais (1993), a dealer’s reservation prices to buy or sell are a monotone 
function of her inventory. If inventory considerations are important, one would expect these to 
be reflected in the quality of execution offered to a trade i.e., effective spread charged by the 
dealer executing the trade. We define the Effective Spread ESτ charged for trade τ  in relation 
to the prevailing mid-price defined as the average of the best bid and the best ask price. 
Hence, for a public buy (i.e. dealer sell) trade: 
  ( )Transaction Price MidPriceES
MidPrice
τ τ
τ
τ
−
=    (4a) 
And for a public sell (ie dealer buy) trade: 
  ( )Transaction Price MidPriceES
MidPrice
τ τ
τ
τ
−
= −    (4b) 
 The results of Hansch et. al. (1999)  indicate that the effective spread charged is a 
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function of stock specific factors, the inside spread, and on whether the particular trade was 
preferenced, and whether it was internalised11. There is also documented evidence that the 
temporary price impact of large public buys is significantly different from that of large public 
sells (e.g. Keim and Madhavan, 1996), and this can arguably cause dealers to behave 
differently when they sell compared to when they buy. Hence, we run the following 
regression separately for public-buys and for public-sells using all measures of equivalent 
inventory: 
20
, 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
j j
i
ES D OI EI Inside Spread PI PNI NPIτ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τγ δ δ δ δ δ δ ξ
=
= + + + + + + +∑ (5) 
where Dj (j=1, 2, ...20) are stock specific dummy variables which take value of one for that 
stock and zero otherwise,  jγ  (j=1, 2, ..... 20) are stock specific intercept terms; OIτ and 
EIτ are respectively the  ordinary inventory level and the equivalent inventory level of the 
dealer executing that trade a second before the trade; InsideSpreadτ is the inside spread at the 
time of the trade (defined as best ask minus best bid divided by the mid-price); PIτ is a 
dummy variable for Preferenced & Internalized trades, PNIτ is a dummy variable for 
Preferenced & Non-Internalized trades, NPIτ is a dummy variable for Non-Preferenced & 
Internalized trades, and τξ  is a white noise error term12. 
 According to inventory models of dealership markets, the greater the inventory of a 
dealer, the keener she is to sell, and the lower will be the effective spread she will charge to a 
public-buy (i.e. dealer-sell) trade and the larger would be the effective spread she will charge 
                                                 
11 A public-buy (public-sell) trade is preferenced when it is executed by a dealer not posting the lowest ask 
(highest bid) price. A public trades is internalized if the broker firm is the same as the dealer firm. 
12 In the context of the quality of execution, the mid-nineties have seen a major controversy over quote-
clustering and collusion by dealers on the NASDAQ (Christie and Schultz, 1994, Christie, Harris, and Schultz, 
1995, and Barclay, 1997), a problem that was alleviated after the 1997 market reforms (described in Barclay, 
Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz, 1999). Quote clustering does not appear to have been a problem on the 
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to a public-sell (i.e. dealer-buy) trade. This should translate into a negative (positive) slope 
coefficient on inventory in the regression in eq. (5) for public-buy (public-sell) trades.    
 Table 6 reports the results of running the regressions of eq. (5) for public trades, with 
ordinary inventory and either total or unhedgeable, firm-wide or industry-desk based 
equivalent inventory, one at a time. The results are reported separately for large, medium and 
small public trades. In all cases, ordinary inventories have significant explanatory power for 
public-sell trades. Consistent with expectation, dealers charge, based on their ordinary 
inventories, a significantly higher (p-value << 0.01) effective spread. For large and medium 
trades, they charge about twenty basis points more for a divergence of one standard deviation 
of ordinary inventory, and for small trades, they charge about four basis points more on 
average. In contrast, most of the equivalent inventory measures do not have significant 
explanatory power. The regression coefficients on the equivalent inventory measures are not 
significantly different from zero (p-values >> 0.1) except for industry-desk based total and 
unhedgeable equivalent inventory in the set of medium size trades.   
 For public-buy trades, the effective spread charged depends significantly on ordinary 
inventories in a direction consistent with the inventory models only for large trades, and even 
for these trades the dependence is significant only at marginal significance levels (p-value 
about 0.1).  For large public buy trades, dealers charge (based on their ordinary inventories) a 
marginally significantly lower effective spread of about ten basis points for a divergence of 
one standard deviation of ordinary inventory. In contrast, the effective spread charged to large  
public-buy trades does not depend significantly on any of the equivalent inventory measures. 
 For medium and small public buy trades, the effective spread charged does not depend 
significantly on any inventory measure, neither ordinary inventory nor any of the equivalent 
                                                                                                                                                        
LSE, at least during the sample period (see Naik and Yadav, 2000). 
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inventories.  
 The strong and significant dependence of the quality of execution of public sell trades 
on ordinary inventory is being documented for the first time in the empirical market 
microstructure literature. However, what is more important from the perspective of this paper 
is that the equivalent inventory measures do not have significant explanatory power in these 
regressions. This suggests that the relative keenness of the dealers to execute (at least) public 
(sell) trades is consistent with their desire to reduce the divergence of their ordinary 
inventories rather than that of either measure of their equivalent inventory. These results, once 
again, reject the predictions of Ho and Stoll (1983) and Froot and Stein (1998) models but are 
consistent with the predictions of decentralized market-making model where individual 
dealers care the most about their own ordinary inventory risk exposure.  
 The above analysis focuses on public trades. Ordinarily, a similar relation should hold 
with inter-dealer trades as well. However, there are well-established pricing norms followed 
on the LSE for inter-dealer trades, and these norms are likely to result in effective spreads 
charged in inter-dealer trades not being dependent at all on inventory. On the LSE, there are 
two types of inter-dealer trades. First, trades are executed anonymously through an order-
matching system called the Inter-Dealer Broker (IDB) system. And second, trades are 
executed non-anonymously through telephone negotiations. The anonymous inter-dealer 
trades are executed at or very close to mid-quote prices (plus a commission cost) while the 
non-anonymous inter-dealer trades are executed either at the best bid or at the best ask price 
(see Reiss and Werner, 1997 for details). Hence, the effective spread charged to anonymous 
inter-dealer trades is generally zero while that charged for non-anonymous trades is generally 
half of the prevailing inside spread. These pricing norms do not allow dealers much flexibility 
in setting effective spreads, and therefore, effective spreads charged to inter-dealer trades on 
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the LSE need not depend significantly on inventory and may not help in shedding light on the 
dealer behavior predicted by different models. Consistent with this expectation, when we run 
the regression in eq. (5) with inter-dealer trades, we fail to find a relation (not reported) 
between effective spreads charged in inter-dealer trades and any inventory measure.  
  
5.  Robustness checks 
  
 In section 4, we document strong results that the risk exposures arising from positions 
in correlated stocks is not an important determinant of trading behavior of dealers in 
individual stocks. In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to potential 
measurement errors in several ways.   
 First, we investigate whether the perceived absence of portfolio effects is driven by 
poor measurement. The most common manifestation of poor measurement is inadequate 
statistical resolution. However, in our case, the results are statistically very strong. The 
coefficients on ordinary inventory are consistently large in magnitude, of the same sign and 
statistically highly significant, while those on equivalent inventory measures are consistently 
very small in magnitude, often of varying sign, and statistically totally insignificant. It is true 
that the fact that a parameter estimate is not significantly different from zero for equivalent 
inventories is not a proof that the underlying parameter is in fact zero. However, the t-
statistics are consistently so close to zero that is difficult to dispute the inference that the 
parameter is virtually zero, at least from an economic standpoint. 
 Second, we repeat our empirical analyses using inventory levels instead of relative 
inventories. Hence, we test whether public and inter-dealer trades are executed by dealers 
with negative (positive) inventory levels. Similarly, we test whether ordinary and equivalent 
inventory levels influence the quality of execution. We find that only ordinary inventory 
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levels continue to explain dealers’ trading behavior. 
 Third, we re-calculate the equivalent inventory measures by summing the second term 
in eq. (1) over just those stocks for which the ,j kβ  are significantly different from zero.  Once 
again, we find that the results are virtually identical. In the same vein, we test the robustness 
of the conclusion to the way we estimate ,j kβ in eq. (1). Our earlier analysis estimated the 
,j kβ ex-ante using historical returns. So, we re-run the analyses using equivalent inventories 
calculated on the basis of a perfect foresight ,j kβ estimated using in-sample returns. Once 
again, we find that only ordinary inventories are important determinants of dealers’ trading 
behavior. 
 Fourth, in addition to our parametric test examining inventory distance of dealers 
executing public and inter-dealers trades (Table 5), we also conduct a non-parametric test 
based on ranks where in we compare the rank of the dealer executing the trade with that of the 
median rank. We find that dealers with divergent ordinary inventory ranks, and not divergent 
equivalent inventory ranks, execute public and inter-dealer trades.  
  Fifth, six stocks in our sample (Asda Group, Land Securities, NatWest Bank, 
Enterprise Oil, Wellcome and WPP Group) either have ADR’s listed on them on the NYSE 
and the NASDAQ, or have options listed on them on the London Traded Options Market, or 
both. This can potentially contaminate inventory measurement. Therefore, we repeat our 
analyses excluding these stocks and find qualitatively similar results.  
 Finally, we examine whether our results are being driven by stocks with relatively low 
levels of dependence on the systematic factors that arguably generate correlations between 
pairs of individual stocks. We expect the importance of portfolio effects to depend on the R2 
of the regression of the return of each of our sample stocks on systematic risk factors. We 
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proxy this by the R2 of the regression on the main factor, i.e. market returns. Table 1 shows 
that, within our sample, the highest explanatory power of market returns is for NatWest Bank 
(63%), Spirax-Sarco Engineering (56%), and Land Securities (51%). We accordingly re-run 
our analyses for each of the twenty sample stocks separately. The results for NatWest Bank, 
Spirax-Sarco Engineering, and Land Securities are each qualitatively identical to the results 
for the whole sample. In particular, ordinary inventories, and not equivalent inventories 
(whether total or unhedgeable and whether firm-wide or industry-desk based) best explain the 
trading behavior of dealers.  
  
6.  Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we investigate, for the first time, the importance of correlated exposures 
in the trading and pricing decisions of financial intermediaries. We compute the ordinary 
inventory positions of London equity dealers across all stocks using a particularly rich 
transactions dataset from the LSE. Following Ho and Stoll (1983), and Froot and Stein (1998) 
respectively, we also construct dealers' total equivalent inventories and unhedgeable 
equivalent inventories in each individual stock, based on dependence between total returns 
and market-filtered returns. We examine whether the trading and pricing decisions of these 
dealers in individual stocks are more closely related to their ordinary inventory of that stock, 
or to either measure of their equivalent inventory. We construct equivalent inventory in two 
ways: one based on centralized market-making structure that aggregates correlated risk 
exposures across all stocks and the other based on an industry-desk based organisational 
structure that aggregates correlated risk exposures across stocks belonging to the same 
industry. 
We find strong evidence that the decision-making of dealers is governed by their 
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ordinary inventories, and not by either of their equivalent inventories. In particular, we find 
that dealers’ ordinary inventories revert significantly more rapidly to the mean compared to 
either measure of their equivalent inventories. We observe that a dealer’s quote changes are 
significantly related to her ordinary inventory changes and not to either measure of her 
equivalent inventory changes. We find that the dealers with divergent ordinary inventories, 
rather than divergent equivalent inventories, execute public trades and engage in inter-dealer 
trades. Finally, we find that dealers offer significantly better quality of execution to trades that 
reduce the divergence of ordinary inventories rather than trades that reduce the divergence of 
either measure of their equivalent inventories. Furthermore, these findings are robust to 
several alternative specifications.  
Our findings strongly reject the predictions of the Ho and Stoll (1983) model and the 
Froot and Stein (1998) model. However, they are consistent with the decentralised 
organisation of dealer firms, where the market-making function is delegated to a large number 
of individual dealers. In such a decentralized framework, due to difficulties in sharing 
information across individual dealers, and/or the nature of their incentive contracts, individual 
dealers care only about the inventory risk exposures of the stocks they manage rather than 
worrying about the risk exposures in correlated stocks of other individual dealers within the 
firm. In particular, their trading behavior is driven by the risk contributed by individual stock 
inventories and not by any measure of their equivalent inventories.  
It is important to note that our finding of the lack of active ex ante risk management 
(based on reinforcing or off-setting effects from correlated stocks) does not preclude ex post 
risk management at the centralized firm level. The firm can certainly hedge (at periodic 
intervals) the market risk of its portfolio with suitable futures contracts. Our results show that, 
such centralized risk management, to the extent it exists, does not affect the trading behavior 
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of the dealer firm in individual stocks. 
So we come back to the question we asked at the beginning of this article: “If I am 
long one million dollars in GM, and I am short one million dollars in Ford, am I still long one 
million dollars in GM?”. The answer seems to be, “Yes, I behave as if I am still long one 
million dollars in GM, (and short one million dollars in Ford)”.  
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Appendix Construction of ordinary and equivalent inventory series 
 
We construct the inventory series of different dealers along the lines of Hansch, Naik 
and Viswanathan (1998) reproduced here for ready reference. Let ,
j
i tQ  denote the level of 
ordinary inventory of dealer i  in stock j at time t.  Following this convention, we denote the 
inventory at the start of the sample period as (t = 0) as , 0
j
iQ . Although this starting inventory 
is not observable by us, we show below that the standardized inventories we use in our 
empirical tests do not depend on the initial inventory level.  
In every stock, we consider all trades, public as well as inter-dealer, which dealer i  
executes in her capacity as a principal. We define ,
j
i tq  as positive (negative) when dealer i  
buys (sells) a quantity q of stock j. We further define ,
j
i tQ  = , 0
j
iQ  + 1 ,
s t j
s i sq
=
=
Σ  as the inventory 
level of market maker i in stock j at time t.  In this way we construct a time series of each 
market maker i’s inventory level in each stock j from the start (t = 0) to the end (t = T) of our 
sample period.  For each of the inventory series, we compute the sample mean  
                                            
,
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and sample standard deviation ( jiS ).   
Because market makers differ in terms of their risk aversion or capitalization, their 
inventories cannot be compared with each other directly.  We control for differences in risk 
aversion by standardizing their inventories (i.e. subtracting the sample mean and dividing it 
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by the sample standard deviation of the inventory series. We define ,
j
i tI  the standardized 
ordinary inventory of dealer i in stock j at time t as 
                          
,
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which is independent of the initial inventory 
,0
j
iQ . 
Since our dataset identifies each of the dealers across different stocks, we use this 
information to create the equivalent inventory series for each dealer in each of our twenty 
sample stocks.  Due to differences in the price per share of different stocks, we convert the 
ordinary inventory values in Pound Sterling using the contemporaneous inside spread mid-
price jtP  in stock j at time t before constructing an equivalent inventory series. For each of 
our sample stocks, we compute the equivalent inventory level of dealer i in stock j at time t as  
1853
, ,, ,
1,
kj jj j k
i t t j k ti t k t
k k j
EQ P PQ Qβ
=
= ≠
= + ∑  
where j, kβ  is the regression coefficient capturing the dependence of the return of stock k on 
that of stock j, ,
j k
j k
j
COV(  , )R R
VAR( )R
β = . Similar to ordinary inventory construction, we define 
the standardized equivalent inventory of dealer i in stock j at time t as 
 
,
,
j j
i t ij
i t j
i
EQ EQ
EI
SE
−
=  
 
where jiEQ and
j
iSE are the mean and standard deviation of the equivalent inventory series of 
dealer i in stock j. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of sample stocks 
This table provides important descriptive statistics of the twenty sample stocks.  Total Turnover equals the average daily Pound Sterling value of public and 
inter-dealer trades over the sample period.  Public Turnover equals the average daily Pound Sterling value of public trades over the sample period.  Daily 
public trades are the average number of public trades (excluding inter-dealer trades) per day.   # of dealers is the number of market makers in each stock. 
Avg. inside spread is  measured as a percentage of inside spread mid-point and are reported in basis points (bp). Avg. ,j kβ reports the average of the 
regression coefficients used in the construction of the respective equivalent inventory. # of stocks indicate the number of stocks in the industry the sample 
stock belongs to. Market model R-square reports the R-square when return of the sample stock is regressed on the FTSE All Share index. 
 
Name of the Stock  
Total 
Turnovr 
£000’s 
Public 
Turnovr 
£000’s 
Daily 
Public 
Trades 
# 
of 
dealers 
Avg. 
Inside 
Spread 
Avg. 
,j kβ  
TEI_FW  
Avg. 
,j kβ  
UEI_FW
Avg. 
,j kβ  
TEI_ID 
Avg. 
,j kβ  
UEI_ID
#  
of 
Stocks   
Market 
model 
R-square 
High liquidity stocks 
NatWest Bank 30057 16257 172 15 59 0.29 0.45 0.44 0.16 9 62.5% 
ASDA Group 12870 6399 68 15 67 0.25 0.38 0.23 0.13 16 12.2% 
De La Rue 12047 6733 76 13 67 0.57 0.49 0.19 0.18 7 36.9% 
Enterprise Oil 8896 4926 46 13 96 0.38 0.34 0.15 0.11 14 30.8% 
North West Water  8295 7367 21 9 238 0.24 0.45 0.44 0.43 11 30.9% 
Sun Alliance  7427 5030 19 14 94 0.29 0.37 0.34 0.22 8 49.5% 
Wellcome 6468 4143 121 14 173 0.24 0.29 0.17 0.13 10 13.1% 
AAH 5230 3383 94 9 55 0.48 0.41 0.21 0.20 21 37.0% 
APV 5200 3719 47 10 61 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.02 7 47.5% 
BUNZL 4940 2851 29 12 61 0.34 0.38 0.10 0.10 6 47.4% 
Medium liquidity stocks 
FKI 4502 2992 42 12 140 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.14 14 37.2% 
London & Manchester 4322 2924 21 8 92 0.41 0.46 0.17 0.15 39 33.0% 
Spirax-Sarco Engg. 2381 1856 10 8 150 0.86 0.89 0.33 0.32 8 55.7% 
Wassall 2068 1488 14 8 98 0.37 0.27 0.19 0.10 23 28.1% 
Land Securities 1668 997 20 8 216 0.41 0.58 0.16 0.15 22 50.6% 
Guardian Royal Exchange 1189 973 10 6 113 0.26 0.28 0.10 0.08 22 35.8% 
RMC Group 889 656 9 7 118 0.43 0.49 0.09 0.10 21 42.6% 
First Leisure Corp 661 556 4 7 99 0.68 0.73 0.29 0.29 9 41.5% 
T & N 559 542 4 5 75 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.16 8 41.4% 
WPP Group 439 331 7 5 117 0.19 0.28 0.05 0.03 6 4.3% 
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Table 2   Mean reversion in ordinary and equivalent inventories 
This table reports the results of the regression   
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1t t t t t t tI D I D I D I D I D Iα φ φ φ φ φ ψ− − − − −∆ = + + + + + +  
where ( 1,2,..,5)lD l =  are dummy variables that equal 1 if the relative inventory lies within or beyond a given number of standard deviations (σ ), 1D = 1 if 
1 2tI σ− ≥ , otherwise zero; 
2D = 1 if 12 tIσ σ−> ≥ , otherwise zero; 
3D = 1 if 1tIσ σ−> > − , otherwise zero; 
4D = 1 if 1 2tIσ σ−− ≥ > − , otherwise zero, and 
5D = 1 if 12 tIσ −− > , otherwise zero, ( 1,2,..,5)l lφ =  represents the intensity of mean reversion which depends on the relative inventory level, and tψ  is a 
white noise error term.  
 
 
Mean Reversion  
Coefficients 
Ordinary 
Inventory 
OI 
Total Equiv. 
Inventory 
Firm-Wide 
TEI_FW 
Total Equiv. 
Inventory 
Industry-Desk 
TEI_ID 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
Firm-Wide 
UEI_FW 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
Industry-Desk 
UEI_ID 
OI 
minus 
TEI_FW 
OI 
minus 
TEI_ID 
OI 
minus 
UEI_FW 
OI 
minus 
UEI_ID 
Inventory level is greater than or equal to two standard deviations 
High &Med. -0.561 -0.490 -0.301 -0.326 -0.343 -0.072 -0.261 -0.235 -0.219 
Liquidity stocks (-53.28) (-50.30) (-24.99) (-38.22) (-27.50) (-5.00) (-16.31) (-17.37) (-13.40) 
Inventory level greater than or equal to one standard deviation but less than two standard deviations 
High &Med. -0.214 -0.160 -0.162 -0.204 -0.187 -0.053 -0.051 -0.009 -0.027 
Liquidity stocks (-21.75) (-17.56) (-22.89) (-23.15) (-22.18) (-3.96) (-4.25) (-0.71) (-2.05) 
Inventory level lying between plus one to minus one standard deviations 
High &Med. -0.151 -0.122 -0.106 -0.124 -0.143 -0.029 -0.045 -0.027 -0.009 
Liquidity stocks (-16.79) (-14.09) (-16.10) (-14.69) (-17.71) (-2.31) (-4.03) (-2.22) (-0.72) 
Inventory level less  than or equal to minus one standard deviation but greater than minus two standard deviations 
High &Med. -0.234 -0.188 -0.165 -0.156 -0.199 -0.046 -0.069 -0.078 -0.035 
Liquidity stocks (-24.81) (-20.74) (-23.03) (-18.11) (-23.77) (-3.50) (-5.82) (-6.11) (-2.78) 
Inventory level is less than or equal to minus two standard deviations 
High &Med. -0.548 -0.392 -0.360 -0.361 -0.471 -0.155 -0.188 -0.187 -0.077 
Liquidity stocks (-41.17) (-31.86) (-26.07) (-26.67) (-41.30) (-8.58) (-9.79) (-9.83) (-4.37) 
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Table 3 Quote changes and expected inventory changes 
 
This table summarizes the six quote change possibilities and the associated inventory changes.  Ask denotes a 
quote equal to the lowest ask, Bid denotes a quote equal to the highest bid, Straddle denotes a straddling 
position, i.e., neither quote is competitive. Since we are analyzing quote changes, the three diagonal cells state 
‘not applicable’ indicating that these cells do not pertain to any change in quote position. 
 
 
Inventory change associated with quote change 
Quote Change To Bid To Ask To Straddle 
From Bid Not Applicable Large Positive Small Positive 
From Ask Large Negative Not Applicable Small Negative 
From Straddle Small Negative Small Positive Not Applicable 
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Table 4 Quote changes and actual inventory changes 
 
This table shows quote changes and the associated changes in the dealers’ standardized ordinary and different 
measures of equivalent inventories.  Ask denotes a quote equal to the lowest ask quote, Bid denotes a quote 
equal to the highest bid quote, Straddle denotes a straddling position, i.e., neither quote is competitive.  Figures 
are in units of standard deviations of dealers’ standardized inventories. Figures in bold face (italics) indicates 
that the values are significant at five (ten) percent level.  
 
 
Quote  
Change 
From 
Ordinary 
Inventory 
OI 
Total Equiv. 
Inventory 
Firm-Wide 
TEI_FW 
Total Equiv. 
Inventory 
Industry-Desk 
TEI_ID 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
Firm-Wide 
UEI_FW 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
Industry-Desk 
UEI_ID 
Bid to Ask 
0.138 
(7.24) 
-0.013 
(-0.21) 
0.043 
(0.98) 
-0.01 
(-1.3) 
-0.005 
(-0.87) 
Bid to Straddle 
0.067 
(3.78) 
-0.014 
(-0.81) 
-0.02 
(-0.15) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
0.003 
(0.28) 
Ask to Bid 
-0.129 
(-6.86) 
-0.035 
(-0.61) 
0.00 
(0.24) 
-0.00 
(-0.15) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
Ask to Straddle 
-0.058 
(-4.41) 
0.036 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.00 
(0.37) 
-0.00 
(-0.18) 
Straddle to Bid 
0.027 
(1.98) 
-0.021 
(-0.69) 
0.00 
(0.23) 
-0.00 
(-0.13) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
Straddle to Ask 
-0.018 
(-1.69) 
0.043 
(0.42) 
0.00 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.001 
(-0.48) 
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Table 5 Inventory and trade execution  
 
This table reports the mean difference of standardized inventories between the dealer executing the trade and the median market maker, together with corresponding t-
statistics. It reports the results separately for public trades and for inter-dealer trades, and within each category, it reports the mean difference separately for for large-size 
trades (trades greater than or equal to three NMS), medium-size trades (trades greater than one NMS but less than three NMS) and small-size trades (trades less than or equal 
to one NMS).      
 
Public trades Inter-dealer trades Inventory Distance 
Difference 
jDDτ  
with 
Ordinary 
Inventory 
OI 
TotalEquiv 
Inventory 
FirmWide 
TEI_FW 
Total Equiv. 
Inventory 
IndustryDesk 
TEI_ID 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
Firm Wide 
UEI_FW 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
IndustryDesk 
UEI_ID 
Ordinary 
Inventory 
OI 
TotalEquiv 
Inventory 
FirmWide 
TEI_FW 
Total Equiv. 
Inventory 
IndustryDesk 
TEI_ID 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
Firm Wide 
UEI_FW 
Unhedgeable 
Equiv. Inv. 
IndustryDesk 
UEI_ID 
 Large-size public trades Large-size inter-dealer trades 
High 
Liquidity 
0.74 
(8.32) 
0.06 
(0.86) 
-0.03 
(-0.74) 
0.04 
(0.71) 
0.05 
(0.90) 
0.39 
(4.55) 
0.03 
(0.53) 
0.06 
(1.44) 
-0.02 
(-0.36) 
-0.06 
(-1.12) 
Medium 
Liquidity 
0.56 
(9.39) 
-0.04 
(-0.98) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
0.07 
(0.44) 
0.45 
(6.37) 
-0.05 
(-0.84) 
-0.06 
(-1.19) 
0.03 
(0.61) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
All Stocks 0.61 (12.32) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
-0.02 
(-0.41) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.84) 
0.42 
(7.79) 
-0.02 
(-0.38) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
 Medium-size public trades Medium-size inter-dealer trades 
High 
Liquidity 
0.25 
(12.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.60) 
0.00 
(0.38) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.89) 
0.41 
(14.43) 
0.03 
(1.37) 
-0.02 
(-1.12) 
-0.03 
(-1.45) 
0.02 
(0.85) 
Medium 
Liquidity 
0.22 
(7.17) 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.05 
(1.66) 
0.08 
(2.91) 
0.00 
(0.27) 
0.27 
(6.26) 
0.02 
(0.40) 
-0.11 
(-3.23) 
-0.05 
(-1.43) 
0.03 
(0.83) 
All Stocks 0.24 (14.03) 
-0.00 
(-0.27) 
0.02 
(1.45) 
0.03 
(1.62) 
0.01 
(0.90) 
0.37 
(15.59) 
0.03 
(1.35) 
-0.04 
(-2.86) 
-0.04 
(-1.16) 
0.02 
(1.16) 
 Small-size public trades Small-size inter-dealer trades 
High 
Liquidity 
0.02 
(3.29) 
0.00 
(0.55) 
0.00 
(0.25) 
-0.00 
(-0.25) 
-0.00 
(0.93) 
0.25 
(23.79) 
-0.02 
(-1.79) 
-0.00 
(-0.83) 
-0.02 
(-2.21) 
-0.02 
(-2.10) 
Medium 
Liquidity 
0.05 
(3.95) 
0.01 
(0.98) 
-0.02 
(-1.16) 
-0.03 
(-1.16) 
-0.00 
(-0.14) 
0.06 
(2.13) 
-0.01 
(0.58) 
-0.06 
(-2.97) 
-0.05 
(-2.26) 
-0.00 
(-0.27) 
All Stocks 0.03 (4.44) 
0.00 
(0.86) 
-0.01 
(-0.96) 
0.01 
(0.96) 
-0.00 
(-0.92) 
0.23 
(22.92) 
-0.01 
(-1.87) 
-0.02 
(-2.05) 
-0.03 
(-2.84) 
-0.01 
(-2.07) 
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Table 6 Inventories and effective spreads  
 
This table reports the results of the following regression for public trades τ : 
20
1 2 3, 4 5 6
1
j j
i
ES D OI EI InsideSpread PI PNI NPIτ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τγ δ δ δ δ δ δ ξ
=
= + + + + + + +∑  
where Dj (j=1, 2, ...20) are stock specific dummy variables which take value of one for that stock and zero otherwise,  jγ  (j=1, 2, ..... 20) are stock specific intercept terms; 
OIτ and EIτ are respectively the  ordinary inventory level and the equivalent inventory level of the dealer executing that public trade a second before the trade; 
InsideSpreadτ is the inside spread at the time of the public trade (defined as best ask minus best bid divided by the mid-price); PIτ is a dummy variable for Preferenced 
& Internalized trades, PNIτ is a dummy variable for Preferenced & Non-Internalized trades, NPIτ is a dummy variable for Non-Preferenced & Internalized trades, and τξ  
is a white noise error term. The parentheses contain t-statistics for hypotheses that the particular coefficient is equal to zero. Slope coefficients significant at the five (ten) 
percent level are indicated in bold face (italics). 
 
Large-size trades Medium-size trades Small-size trades 
  
Public Sells 
 
  
Public Buys 
 
  
Public Sells 
 
  
Public Buys 
 
  
Public Sells 
 
  
Public Buys 
 
 
Ordinary 
inventory  
combined 
with 
1δ  2δ  1δ  2δ  1δ  2δ  1δ  2δ  1δ  2δ  1δ  2δ  
TEI_FW 20.82 
(4.31) 
2.93 
(0.31) 
-9.41 
(-1.71) 
-2.31 
(-0.33) 
24.70 
(7.56) 
-3.31 
(-0.91) 
-1.12 
(-0.36) 
1.75 
(0.43) 
3.58 
(4.70) 
-0.34 
(-0.40) 
-0.91 
(-0.99) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
TEI_ID 20.72 
(4.21) 
2.82 
(0.38) 
-9.75 
(-1.74) 
-7.18 
(-0.64) 
25.16 
(7.70) 
14.61 
(3.15) 
-1.04 
(-0.34) 
3.31 
(0.63) 
3.58 
(4.71) 
0.25 
(0.25) 
-0.88 
(-0.96) 
0.57 
(0.49) 
UEI_FW 20.74 
(4.19) 
4.27 
(0.58) 
-8.81 
(-1.69) 
-7.08 
(-0.66) 
24.59 
(7.50) 
0.91 
(0.22) 
-0.99 
(-0.31) 
-1.83 
(-0.43) 
3.60 
(4.72) 
-0.37 
(-0.44) 
-1.10 
(-1.19) 
1.89 
(0.84) 
UEI_ID 20.51 
(4.21) 
5.33 
(0.46) 
-9.51 
(-1.72) 
-4.97 
(-0.44) 
23.84 
(7.30) 
12.41 
(3.31) 
-1.15 
(-0.36) 
3.17 
(0.77) 
3.65 
(4.76) 
-0.56 
(-0.70) 
-0.91 
(-0.98) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
 
